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Abstract 
The study of welfare capitalism is concerned with a founding question of political economy, 
namely how capitalism and democracy can be combined. Ever since the publication of 
Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism in 1990, the answer was sought in 
identifying ideal types of welfare states that support a class compromise. The Varieties of 
(Welfare) Capitalism literature is increasingly used as a complementary theory of production 
systems although its rationale for social policies is largely incompatible with the Worlds 
typology. This article argues, first, that popular regime typologies have degenerated as a 
research programme, notwithstanding their many achievements. The main reason for this lies 
in a simplistic notion of the relationship between politics and economics in modern society. 
Secondly, the article outlines an alternative for analysing welfare provisions and their 
evolution, drawing on insights of the new politics and the new economics of welfare. This 
framework can give a systematic account of welfare program restructuring that undermines 
regime typologies. It suggests a different question for the political economy of welfare, 
namely how capitalism and democracy can be kept distinct.   
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Collapsing Worlds and Varieties of 
welfare capitalism: In search of a new 
political economy of welfare  
 
Introduction  
The question of how to study welfare capitalism brings us back to one of the 
founding questions of comparative political economy: ‘how is it possible to 
combine capitalism with democracy?’ (Iversen 2006, 601) Capitalism produces 
inequalities that distribute economic power unevenly while democracy 
assigns political power, in terms of the vote, evenly. So why do the many poor 
not elect politicians that expropriate the rich; or if they do, how can capitalism 
survive? One answer is: the class compromise enshrined in the welfare state 
prevents the poor from soaking the rich.  
Ever since the publication of Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism in 1990, this answer was sought in identifying distinct ideal types 
of welfare states that can explain different variants of the class compromise. 
Power resource theory claimed that the size and structure of the welfare state 
shows the historical importance of the political left and its alliances with the 
middle classes (Korpi 1974, 2006). The three Worlds classification is a direct 
descendant of this social policy tradition. Another set of comparative political 
economists concentrated on the role of organized labour and the extent to 
which it was co-opted by the state (Goldthorpe 1984). The Varieties of 
(welfare) capitalism typology is in this industrial relations school of thought, 
following Swenson (1991, 2002) in the shift of research interest to the role of 
big business and organized employers.  
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This contribution has the same point of departure as these regime typologies, 
namely that the co-evolution of capitalism and welfare states raises 
fundamental questions about political economy, both as a theoretical field of 
study and as an empirical phenomenon of public policymaking. But in 
contrast to these two approaches, I suggest that the construction of ideal types 
at the country level no longer generates interesting research puzzles and in 
this sense has degenerated as a research program, despite the many 
achievements of these regime typologies. Throughout, I will focus on the 
time-honoured Worlds (Esping-Andersen 1990) and the newly imported 
Varieties derived from research coordinated by Hall and Soskice (2001a) 
because they are the two most popular typologies. The second part of my 
paper is then devoted to outlining a different theoretical and analytical 
framework for studying welfare capitalism in comparative political economy. 
It combines the insights of the new politics of welfare (eg Pierson 2001; 
Hacker 2002) and of the new economics of welfare (eg Barr 1992; Sinn 1995, 
Atkinson 1999). They were unrelated attempts at explaining the resilience of 
the welfare state after the Golden Age of expansion had come to an end. Their 
insights are not easy to reconcile but this lack of a pre-ordained, harmonious 
relationship between the politics and the economics of welfare in modern 
society is itself an insight and a crucial ingredient of what might be called a 
new political economy of welfare. The lack of a pre-ordained relationship 
means that we cannot simply assume the direction of causation between 
economics and politics: neither that economic pressures will generate 
predictable problem-solving responses in the political sphere, nor that the 
political institutions will determine how much economic change there can be.  
The proposed framework seeks an answer at another level of political 
economy analysis than the nation state, starting from the assumption of the 
new politics of welfare, namely that once in place policies create their own 
Waltraud Schelkle 
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constituencies and, adding insights of the new economics, shape the economic 
processes of which they become a part. The main difficulty for advancing an 
alternative that retains at least some of the synthesizing and mapping 
capacity of regime typologies is to conceptualise social policies in a generic 
and meaningful way. I suggest generalizing the notions of insurance, residual 
assistance and universal public goods that are common in social policy 
research and were also important for the Worlds classification.1 The 
generalization is necessary to include not only cash transfers, but also services 
and regulations that provide safety nets. But, and this must be stressed so as 
to prevent false expectations, rather than proposing a full-fledged new theory, 
this proposal uses findings in comparative social policy research and shows 
how they fit into richer and yet systematic accounts of policy reform if they 
are not bound to demonstrate each time that the object of study fits into the 
straitjacket of a national regime.   
The next section explains what makes the Worlds and Varieties typologies so 
attractive but also why they both show signs of a Kuhnian paradigm crisis 
where empirical anomalies abound and require ever more ad hoc 
explanations (Kuhn 1962, ch.8).  This part does not go into details of just how 
‘degenerative’ these typologies are as research programmes in Lakatos’ use of 
the term (Lakatos 1970) because it would give the wrong impression that I am 
dismissive of what many comparative welfare state researchers do, which I 
am not. I also leave aside many other valid points that have been raised by 
insightful critics and led to fruitful debates with the proponents of Worlds and 
Varieties (Esping-Andersen 1999; Hancké, Rhodes & Thatcher 2007a). The 
second main part outlines an alternative conceptualization of political 
economy and comparative methodology that can relate this alternative to 
                                                        
1 Esping-Andersen (1990) assumed that the class compromise in conservative welfare regimes 
led to the dominance of insurance schemes, while residual assistance schemes prevailed in 
liberal welfare states and universal benefits were the social policy instrument of choice in social-
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recent research on the political economy of welfare reform.2 The conclusions 
come back to the question of how the welfare state relates to capitalism and 
democracy. 
 
Collapsing Worlds and Varieties of Welfare Capitalism  
The proponents of Worlds or Varieties see their regimes as ideal types of 
welfare capitalisms.3  For the comparative study of welfare states, regime 
typologies fulfilled a similar role to that of Weber’s ideal types in sociology in 
the early 20th century, which made them understandably attractive. To the 
credit of all the research that has been done in their wake or in parallel, 
however, we are no longer in the phase where we need ideal types to map the 
terrain.  An analytical framework built on ideal types captures this world as 
an aberration from the theory, of which there can obviously be an infinite 
number (Luhmann 1980, 244). These regime typologies give us rather 
distorted maps, typically out of date and missing crucial detail for some, 
while stressing irrelevant features for others.  
 
Why are regime typologies so attractive? 
The notion of a regime and of institutional complementarities that reduce to a 
few configurations brings order to a bewildering diversity of welfare schemes 
and their viable relationships. Esping-Andersen postulates that the 
                                                        
2 The literature is vast; see for instance Ferrera & Rhodes (2000); Hacker (2004); Streeck & 
Thelen (2005). 
3 Those who use his classification invariably think of Worlds as ideal types (eg Ebbinghaus & 
Manow 2001, 8-9; Arts & Gelissen 2002) while Esping-Andersen (1990, 49) noted that ‘[i]n 
reality, however, there are no one-dimensional nations in the sense of a pure case’. For Varieties, 
see Hall & Soskice (2001b,8, 35); Ebbinghaus & Manow (2001, 5); and Hancké, Rhodes & 
Thatcher (2007a, 13, 25). 
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differences between OECD countries can be boiled down to three different 
Worlds of welfare capitalism. They are characterised by different degrees of 
decommodification (replacement of market earnings), types of stratification 
(ascription of social status) and different main providers of welfare (state, 
family, market) of the regime: There is, first, the Scandinavian Social-democratic 
World with generous decommodification and the stratification of inclusive 
social citizenship, financing universal benefits through taxes. The state is the 
main welfare provider in this regime. Second, we have the Continental 
European Conservative World with a varying degree of decommodification and 
stratification that preserves the status of workers, white collar employees, 
civil servants, or the self-employed through separate insurance schemes. The 
family is supposedly the main welfare provider in this regime. And third, the 
Anglo-Saxon Liberal World is characterised by minimal decommodification and 
stigmatising stratification through residual, means-tested benefits. Here, the 
market is the main welfare provider.  
Hall, Soskice and their many distinguished co-authors claim that, from the 
point of view of the firm, there are two Varieties of capitalism, of which there 
may be some sub-varieties but the major institutional complementaries 
between labour markets, finance, corporate governance and training systems 
are captured by this alternative. The Coordinated Market Economy ‘is 
characterized by non-market relationships, collaboration, credible 
commitments, and the “deliberative calculations” of firms’. The Liberal Market 
Economy ‘is one of arm’s length, competitive relations, formal contracting, and 
supply-and-demand price signalling’ in labour, capital and product markets 
(Hancké et al 2007a, 5). The Varieties approach looks at welfare provisions 
insofar they serve to commodify the workforce in the interest of employers.  
This systemic view has taken comparative welfare state research out of its 
traditional confines. Esping-Andersen (1990, 29-33) was quite explicit about 
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the necessity to reconnect the research of welfare states and regimes with 
political economy: ultimately, it is differences in political coalition-building 
across economically defined classes that gave contemporary welfare states 
their particular shape and ideological imprint. The Varieties typology draws 
the attention of researchers to the ‘ways in which social policies can improve 
the operation of labor markets, notably from the perspective of the firm.’ (Hall 
& Soskice 2001b, 50) Hence it provides arguments for ‘social policy as a 
productive factor’, which the Worlds classification attributes to the ‘social 
investment state’ in Sweden only (Esping-Andersen 1996, 3). 
Regime typologies also became politically attractive since the 1980s when 
conservative governments’ attack on welfare was in full swing (Pierson 1994). 
They seemed to provide effective counterarguments to the view that there is 
one best practice of a market economy and that economic pressures will force 
convergence on a minimalist welfare state. This is not to deny that those 
attacks and waves of trade liberalisation, socio-demographic change and 
deindustrialisation have an effect on the existing configurations of welfare 
systems. There are plausible orthodox responses to this, renewing the non-
convergence hypothesis (Hancké et al 2007a, 10-13). One is that comparative 
institutional advantages and institutional complementarities will play 
themselves out and lead to even more pronounced regime formations.4 In 
welfare reforms, some may utilise their traditions of social partnership, while 
others promote effective targeting combined with absorptive labour markets 
(Featherstone 2004, 426-427). Another orthodox response is to identify regime-
specific pathways of adjustment, for instance different welfare reform 
strategies of dealing with the trilemma of the expanding service sector 
economy between budgetary restraint, income equality, and employment 
                                                        
4 See Höpner (2005) and Crouch et al (2005) for a rich discussion of the concept of institutional 
complementarity. None seems to believe that identified complementarities can predict the path 
of adjustment.  
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growth; the social-democratic strategy compromises on budgetary restraint, 
the neo-liberal sacrifices income equality, and the corporatist strategy 
foregoes employment growth (Iversen & Wren 1998).  
Shared attractiveness does not make Worlds and Varieties compatible, contrary 
to the claims of Hall & Soskice (2001b, 50-51) or Ebbinghaus & Manow (2001, 
3, 7-8). It is not surprising that they differ, given their different origins in 
social policy research and power resources theory, industrial relations 
research and neo-corporatist theory, respectively. The Worlds classification is 
based on major transfer programmes of welfare states that it portrays as 
originating in modern state building in the epoch of industrialisation. By 
contrast, Varieties is a ‘firm-centred political economy’ and focuses on directly 
employment-enhancing social policies within an established set of 
institutions. Moreover, the decommodification and stratification indices in 
Worlds portray the welfare state as an institution that, to different degrees, 
emancipates individuals from the market and replaces class differences by 
status differences of its own. The liberal-coordination distinction of Varieties, 
by contrast, portrays social protection as commodifying, often reflecting the 
power of employers: ‘[E]mployment and income protection can be seen as 
efforts to increase workers’ dependence on particular employers, as well as 
their exposure to labour market risks. Moreover, social protection often stems 
from the strength rather than the weakness of employers.’ (Estévez-Abe et al 
2001, 181) Worlds and Varieties are diametrically opposed in this respect which 
renders attempts at combining the two approaches questionable.5 Moreover, it 
requires not only political but also economic theory to explain how the 
promise of generous decommodification may lead to a more productive 
                                                        
5 This is true even if undertaken as competently as by Pierson 2000, 793-800; or in Ebbinghaus & 
Manow (2001b). Scharpf & Schmidt (2000: 18) have early on admitted that they ‘struggled with 
these contingencies’ created by overlapping typologies of welfare states (following Worlds), 
industrial relations systems (following Varieties) and governance systems (anticipating a later 
research strand in Varieties).  
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economy. Worlds largely fails in this respect while Varieties focuses on labour 
market incentives. This does not suffice to explain why wealthy economies 
typically have generous welfare provisions and build them up to keep the 
economy afloat in a crisis, as in the US during the Great Depression once and 
again in the Great Recession of 2007-09. 
 
What are the symptoms of a research programme in crisis? 
Both the Worlds and the Varieties typologies have solicited much debate. The 
high quality of the criticism expressed in these debates is to their credit, 
indicating that it is worth engaging with these typologies. Despite these valid 
criticisms, however, the sociology and philosophy of science associated with 
the work of Thomas Kuhn (1962) and Imre Lakatos (1970) suggest that 
theories and their underlying research programmes are not simply 
abandoned if certain countries or phenomena do not fit. The anomalies and 
ancillary hypotheses will proliferate until the search for an alternative 
becomes imperative. The research puzzle why countries respond differently 
to the same pressure (be it industrialisation or globalisation) becomes 
repetitive rather than exciting, especially when there is not a response at the 
country level but, for instance, cross-country convergence in the thrust of 
labour market and family policies while in pensions governments have gone 
for very different mixes of public, occupational and personal sources of old-
age security, not necessarily true to type (Palier and Martin 2007). The 
following concentrates on anomalies and ad hoc explanations that are most 
significant from a political economy point of view.  
There is the anomaly, present from the start, that many countries do not fit the 
classification. For the Worlds typology, Scruggs and Allan (2006, 61) find in 
their re-estimate of the decommodification index that ‘at least six of the 
Waltraud Schelkle 
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eighteen countries rank in a group inconsistent with type’. Their other 
attempt at replicating the Worlds classification finds that, on the socialist 
stratification index, two presumably liberal countries, the UK and Canada, 
score highest or higher than most social-democratic countries, respectively 
(Scruggs & Allan 2008, 659-660).  Theirs is the most sophisticated attempt at 
replicating the Worlds classification to date for which they had to construct 
their own data set since the one used by Esping-Andersen was published only 
recently (Korpi & Palme 2008). Scruggs and Allan conclude that Esping-
Andersen has come to his classifications in other, mysterious, ways than the 
ones stated in the Appendices of his book. A recent meta-review that claims 
that 23 studies confirm Esping-Andersen’s typology exclude all studies that 
consider health care and education as part of the welfare state because these 
two social policy areas follow ‘a distinct, different logic from 
decommodification [and] social stratification’ (Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 
2011: 587). In other words, the review needs a massive selection bias to find 
that between two and three countries fit one of the three worlds while the rest 
of the OECD world is a mixed case. 
Similarly, the Varieties classification had notorious difficulties with a number 
of countries.6 For instance, Denmark combines the traits of a coordinated 
market economy with genuinely liberal labour market regulation. Others, like 
France or Japan, are based on coordination by the state that is not captured by 
a firm-centric view with its simple dichotomy. Most former socialist countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe are notorious outliers in both Worlds and 
Varieties, even two decades after they started transition. 
Both regime typologies are seriously disrupted if we look at social services 
and take the related issue of gender into account. It has been pointed out by 
many that the three Worlds classification is so neat only because Esping-
                                                        
6 See, for instance, Crouch (2005, ch.2); Martin & Thelen (2007, 2); Schmidt (2009, 520-522). 
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Andersen left out all programmes based on services rather than transfers, for 
instance health care in contrast to sick pay.7 This is a particularly effective 
critique, because Esping-Andersen himself was critical of expenditure-based 
classifications – only to reproduce this expenditure bias in his 
decommodification index (Esping-Andersen 1990, 19-20; cf. Castles & Mitchell 
1993, 103). Moreover, the Worlds classification is based on the notion of 
‘regimes’, comprising welfare as provided by the state, the market and the 
family; yet the huge area of care services provided in the family and by the 
market is ignored.  
This transfer bias has a male gender bias in its wake. Feminist scholars asked 
early on why defamilialisation is not a criterion of the typology, as 
fundamental as decommodification and stratification.8 But taking 
defamilialisation into account may upset the typology. Less dependence on 
the family as a welfare provider typically comes with a low-pay private care 
sector employing a predominantly female workforce, or at the cost of very 
high occupational segregation as in Denmark and Sweden where women 
provide the replacement services in less well-paid, often part-time public 
sector jobs. Hence, defamilialisation in the social democratic regime is 
supported by a workforce that is more commodified or stratified. To put it in 
Manow’s ingenious phrase, the ‘bad’ or ‘ugly’ are not alternatives but may 
constitute the other side of the ‘good’.9 
The Varieties classification with its focus on occupational welfare includes 
services, in particular education, but confines itself to a narrow range of these 
                                                        
7 See Jensen (2008) for a recent deconstruction of the ‘Worlds of services’. Sick pay is included in 
the decommodification index, along with pensions and unemployment benefits (Esping-
Andersen 1990, 54).  
8 See for instance Lewis (1992); and Orloff (1993), early feminist critiques which Esping-
Andersen (1999: ch.4) conceded without changing his Worlds classification. 
9 Manow (2004) characterized the normative preferences of Esping-Andersen (1990) pertinently 
by translating the Worlds typology of social democratic, liberal and conservative welfare regimes 
into ‘The good, the bad and the ugly.’ 
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services. For instance, all education is analysed only in terms of skills 
formation and vocational training, asking whether it serves the needs of the 
liberal or the coordinated market economy (Estévez-Abe et al 2001; Soskice 
2007, 92-93). This leaves out all the social discipline and integration aspects of 
universal schooling. Care services are ignored in this typology as well, which 
is not surprising given the interest in macro-coordination and the large 
manufacturing firm as the prototypical key player. If care services are 
indirectly taken into account, namely insofar they affect women’s career and 
employment prospects, Estévez-Abe (2006) finds that the coordinated market 
economy does worse in terms of both equality and flexibility of labour market 
outcomes for women with qualifications. This extends to women in low-skill 
jobs if the findings of King and Rueda (2008) are correct that low-paid 
workers are less protected in coordinated market economies than in liberal 
counterparts.10 Hence, the equivalence of the two regimes (low equality/ high 
flexibility in liberal, high equality/ low flexibility in coordinated market 
economies) breaks down if we take into account that gender differences 
matter in labour markets.  
 
What has been done to restore the research programme? 
First of all, ad hoc explanations have been added to the parsimonious 
typologies. This is inherent in the construction of ideal types that takes real 
cases and reduces them to a few important traits through ‘reasoning from 
example’ (Bolderson and Mabbett 1995, 123; cf Crouch 2005, 34-35), in the case 
of Worlds from Sweden, Germany and the US, in Varieties from Germany and 
the US or the UK post-Thatcher. It remains opaque why some traits are 
deemed important while others are not, or which real case is elevated to the 
                                                        
10 See also Orloff (1993, 316). 
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benchmark ideal type for all other cases. Specialists on other countries 
invariably feel that it does not quite fit their favourite example. But they can 
happily engage with the typology and contribute their case. Unfortunately, 
the typology tends to fall apart in the process as all other countries become 
hybrids (and sometimes even the original if it happens to change). This 
required, sooner or later, saying farewell to ‘the idea of parsimony as meaning 
a kind of rough, tough macho theory that concentrates on the big picture’ 
(Crouch 2005, 40).  
The list of types gets correspondingly longer. In Beyond Varieties, the 
classification expands to four types of welfare capitalism, adding a statist and 
a compensating state variety, because the liberal and the coordinated market 
economies cover only OECD countries where the state-economy relationship 
is arm’s length.11 This add-on comes on top of talking about mixed and 
emerging market economies. Attempts to provide a less Euro-centric version 
and include Asian and Latin American countries extend the Varieties by two 
more, namely network and hierarchical market economies (Schneider 2008). 
Similarly, the Worlds classification was criticised early on for missing the 
‘Latin-rim’ or Southern European welfare regimes that cannot be subsumed 
under the continental European type (Ferrera 1996). Castles (1993) was critical 
of the Anglo-Saxon liberal category and added the ‘radical wage earners’ 
regime for countries like Australia where means-testing prevails but 
provisions are not necessarily residual.  
An interesting exception to the tendency of creating ever more fine-grained 
classifications is Hicks and Kenworthy (2003). They collapse the three Worlds 
into two, a ‘progressive liberal’ and a ‘traditional conservative’ cluster, 
expanding on Esping-Andersen’s more recent emphasis on labour market 
                                                        
11Hancké et al (2007a, 23-28); Schmidt (2009, 525-529) also emphasizes state-variants of 
Varieties. 
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regulation and family policies. However, these two Worlds are end-points of a 
continuous scale along which they assign countries, thus ‘shift[ing] attention 
from worlds of welfare capitalism to welfare state dimensions’ (Hicks & 
Kenworthy 2003, 52). It thus means abandoning the categorisation according 
to ideal types. They also link these dimensions to outcomes and find that the 
non-convergence hypothesis becomes problematic. Different ways of doing 
welfare are no longer equivalent; the ‘progressive liberal’ World cluster does 
clearly better on employment performance and gender equality. What this 
means is that focusing on welfare state dimensions, rather than entire fitting 
clusters of dimensions, does not necessarily lead to an ever more confusing 
array of cases and this focus generates interesting research puzzles, for 
instance why governments and their electorates forgo policies that would 
lead to what most people would consider preferable social outcomes. 
Scholars also tried to take the possibility of gradual and endogenous 
transformation more seriously and overcome a conservative bias in the 
institutionalist research paradigm of which regime typologies are one 
strand.12 While still in the institutionalist tradition, their proposals amount to 
a potentially more radical step because it is no longer the assumed existence 
of regimes that guides the research effort but their possible dissolution. The 
five modes of ‘gradual yet transformative change’ that Streeck and Thelen 
(2005) identify are a good example. They argue, in contrast to Iversen and 
Wren (1998), that there is no reason to think that certain modes of reform are 
used only in particular Worlds or Varieties, they are generic ways of describing 
both the evolution of institutions and intentional reform strategies.13 In a 
similar vein, Crouch (2005, 13, 99) argues that ‘real-world institutions’ contain 
                                                        
12 Ferrera and Rhodes (2000); Scharpf and Schmidt (2000); Streeck and Thelen (2005). 
13 The five modes are ‘displacement of dominant with dormant institutions, institutional layering 
and subsequent differential growth, tolerated drift of institutions away from social reality, slow 
conversion of existing institutions to new purposes, and exhaustion due to systemic 
incompatibility and erosion of resources.’ (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 33; my emphasis) 
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‘elements of complexity and incoherence’ that provide room for change and 
innovation, sought by opportunistic actors. The outcome is hybridization as 
Streeck and Thelen (2005, 21) note: ‘All societies are [..] in some way hybrids, 
some more or less so.’  The problem is that each regime is hybrid in different 
ways, not linearly ‘more or less so’ as in a regression-type analysis to which 
the notion of regimes is opposed.  
A parsimonious typology of welfare capitalism cannot be the maxim of a 
research programme. It is at best a desirable research finding that must be 
amenable to empirical scrutiny. Scrupulous attempts are still made; eg by 
Castles and Obinger (2008) who trace ‘families of nations’ over time but have 
to change their labels and the groupings; or by Amable (2003) who identifies 
five groups of countries derived from data about product and labour markets, 
financial and social protection systems. But it seems fair to conclude that the 
desirable research finding has not been established. And why should 
countries with their idiosyncratic histories and imagined communities, their 
different demographic composition and geopolitical dimensions, or the 
ideological swings of democratic government, fall neatly into a few boxes that 
exhaust the possibilities of welfare states in the past, present and future? The 
best we can hope to get from country typologies is a contrived analytics for 
area studies. There must be better ways of comparing welfare regimes, based 
on a theory of political economy in modern society. 
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In search of a new political economy of welfare 
Thanks to the research that has been done within Worlds and Varieties but also 
in parallel research programmes, an alternative approach does not have to 
start from scratch. It can now be regarded as firmly established that national 
welfare regimes are hybrids or ‘mongrels’, rather than ‘thoroughbreds’ 
(Bolderson & Mabbett 1995). It is a moot point whether restructuring 
processes since the 1980s have led to this hybridization and layering of 
different schemes in social policy areas, as Streeck and Thelen (2005) claim, or 
whether we could have seen this all along, as Bolderson and Mabbett (1995) 
argue, if researchers had not been so hooked on classifying each country as 
one world of welfare capitalism.  
The finding of hybridization seems to be a purely negative result. But it is not. 
We need to see it as a phenomenon in its own right, not merely as the 
outcome of failed reform or neoliberal intrusion. First of all, it means that 
there is no consistent welfare regime classification, so the unit of analysis has 
to be changed in line with the conclusion of Scruggs & Allan (2006, 69): ‘If, as 
our results suggest, scores among social-insurance programmes are so weakly 
inter-correlated, we might just as well talk about the individual welfare 
programmes, not regimes.’ Finding a pattern or a systematic way of 
scrutinizing the welfare mix is a challenge though. This conclusion could lead 
us (back) into the Balkanization of social policy research where studies of old 
age security, health care, labour market policies, family support etc. proceed 
independently of each other, with quantitative studies of expenditure levels 
or outcome indicators being the only vehicle to bring it all together. What is 
more, the borders between social policy areas are conventional, politically 
contested and subject to change. Early retirement schemes may belong to old 
age security or to labour market policy; long-term care provisions can be part 
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of health care or a family policy. Arbitrary partitions miss the opportunity to 
learn from reform strategies that deliberately transgress these borders and use 
the technique of issue linkage between policy areas to upset an institutional 
equilibrium.  
To avoid Balkanization, a new political economy of welfare can build on the 
new economics and the new politics of welfare. From the new economics, it 
takes, first of all, a much richer set of economic justifications for social policies 
that can make sense of universal, residual and insurance-based interventions 
– they are not good, bad and ugly, respectively. It can even give us functional 
reasons why we rarely find just one principle applied in a social policy area. 
Each one has disadvantages that may be compensated by introducing another 
programme to make up for it. For instance, an insurance-based pay-as-you-go 
pension system may have coverage problems for all those who have no 
regular earnings history; means-tested benefits like free TV licences and 
universal benefits like free bus passes for all over sixty can make up partly for 
a low entitlement from the main scheme. This layering of schemes with 
different principles is the norm in virtually each social policy area (Bolderson 
and Mabbett 1995) that is ignored in all studies that claim the existence of 
welfare regimes (Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011). 
Secondly and closely related, the new economics provides the generic 
delineation of public policies, referring to social principles of resource 
allocation such as the provision through (public or private) insurance, public 
goods or (negative and positive) taxation. These principles can be applied to 
cash transfers, regulation and services alike. From the new politics, we can 
take the maxim that welfare politics follows social policies14. Different types of 
policy create ‘arenas of power’ (Lowi 1964, 688) since they generate 
                                                        
14 Pierson (1994, 39) presents it as Schattschneider’s methodological principle that ‘policies 
produce politics’; see also Hacker (2002, 40). 
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expectations about different outcomes and hence mobilise particular 
constituencies. This maxim is taken here as a rich and complex research 
hypothesis that can be challenged by scholars who see a leading role for 
politics (Gourevitch 1986, 17; Ross 2000, 29; Vail 2010, 19). Rather than cutting 
the evidence about reform processes to size so as to fit some type, these 
alternatives can serve as guides through the wealth of empirical material now 
available.  
 
Insights of the new economics and the new politics of welfare 
The new economics extended and qualified welfare analysis centred 
exclusively on the notorious equity-efficiency tradeoff.15 Rather than studying 
in ever more detail the disincentives for labour supply from high or 
progressive taxes and generous non-employment benefits, they explore the 
range of social policies that make the provision of equity or security 
complementary to the enhancement of efficiency. To the extent that social 
policies, through services, transfers or redistributive taxes, help to overcome 
market failures or allow individuals to take more gainful risks, the mixed 
economy of welfare generates more income than the private economy of pure 
market exchange.  
The new economics of welfare provides a well-defined, if stylized account of 
social policy characteristics that are likely to matter economically and 
politically. The standard classification of social policy outputs is social 
insurance, universal benefits and means-tested benefits, underpinning as 
indicated the Worlds typology. What the new economics contributed to this 
classification is to look at them systematically as solutions to failures or 
                                                        
15 Cf Barr (1992), Le Grand, Robinson & Propper (1992), Sinn (1995), Atkinson (1996); the new 
economics of welfare has, among others, roots in Joseph Stiglitz’ work on market failures and 
optimal taxation under uncertainty. 
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inefficiencies of the market economy of which a textbook summary can be 
found in Barr (2004, section 4.3). The rather selective take of the Varieties 
literature on social policy can be seen as a radical and one-dimensional lesson 
from the new economics, in that it claims that viable social policy 
programmes require support from the side of employers – or they are not 
viable. Far from taming labour markets, welfare state measures support and 
shape markets. 
For instance, insurance markets suffer from information about risks being 
asymmetrically distributed between prospective insurer and those seeking 
insurance. The policy problem is that adverse selection (hidden information 
about insurance-seekers), moral hazard (hidden action by the insurance-
seeker) or discrimination (cream-skimming by the insurer) will lead to less 
insurance and thus value added than the market could produce to mutual 
advantage. Social policies deliver solutions in that mandatory insurance 
overcomes adverse selection and discrimination while moral hazard may be 
contained by conditionality, for instance requiring a recipient of 
unemployment insurance to seek work and accept suitable job offers. The 
new economics is from the era of retrenchment in that it had a clear normative 
motivation, namely to provide technical arguments against retrenchment (cf 
Atkinson 1999). It identifies distributive effects but instead of leaving the 
verdict about their desirability to the normative welfare economists, by 
trading them off against efficiency effects, the new economics behaves more 
like the technocrat by leaving this verdict to the value judgements of political 
ideologies. What one might see as a weakness in substantive reach, I consider 
to be an analytical strength, consistent with finding more than one valid 
economic reason for doing social policy. But which of those valid reasons 
become practically relevant, is typically beyond the purely economic.  
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The ‘discovery’ of complementarities between social and economic policy 
pushes the economics of the welfare state almost inevitably into the study of 
political economy. The new welfare economics is useful in demonstrating the 
economic equivalence of different allocation mechanisms, for instance the 
equivalence of privately funded pensions and public pay-as-you-go pensions 
in dealing with the aging of society.16 They have different redistributive 
implications, create different risks and incentives but they can be designed so 
as to provide equivalent amounts of insurance. The choice of one over the 
other is thus ascribed to political preferences -- a black box in economics. 
Economists who want to take the analysis further, like Alesina and Glaeser 
(2004) or Amable et al (2006), must combine it with a political analysis of 
policy change.  Non-economists tend to see more than preferences at work. 
What this calls for is a theory of political processes that can explain the 
specifics of diverse social policy choices and outcomes.  
The new politics started from the premise that the process of dismantling the 
welfare state follows another political logic than its expansion during the 
Golden Age. Since the welfare state is popular with the electorate, blame 
avoidance and hiding retrenchment become the overriding strategies of 
reformers. Reformers try to respond to structural pressures, be it exogenous 
change like market integration or endogenous changes like a shift to the 
service economy and the transformations of families.17 But since the 
institutions of social policy create their own stakeholders, attempts at ‘ending 
welfare as we know it’ face an uphill struggle. The predictions of rather 
limited, at best regime-preserving change that could be read into the new 
                                                        
16 Barr (2000); but see Atkinson (1999, chapters 6-7) for an analysis of other relevant 
implications, such as the functioning of capital markets and the emergence of insurance lobbies 
as a political force. 
17 The terms ‘exogenous’ and ‘endogenous’ apply here in the sense of ‘largely independent of the 
welfare state’ and ‘induced by the welfare state itself’, respectively. For instance, the 
transformations of families is an endogenous reform pressure in that the availability of public 
child care allows both partners to pursue a career which in turn calls for more public child care.  
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politics’ emphasis on path dependency have not been borne out by the facts, 
however. This was noted by many, even for the supposedly most immovable 
of objects, namely the Bismarckian conservative regime (Levy 1999; Palier & 
Martin 2007; Vail 2010).  
A lasting contribution of the new politics is the theorem that welfare 
retrenchment follows a different political logic than expansion. This still 
justifies the attribute ‘new’. But blame avoidance and electoral politics proved 
to be unnecessarily reductionist and shallow ideas for the logic of 
retrenchment. They narrow down the institutional structures that deliver 
public services to ‘obstacles’ for change. By contrast, the analytical focus on 
structures of policymaking that shape or even generate reform politics has 
more potential and is more widely shared, for instance, by the state-centred, 
historically informed account of welfare state building of Theda Skocpol 
(1992). The ‘institutional frameworks for the achievement of complex ends’ 
(Hacker 2004, 246) define the space for different constituencies to advance 
their interests and ideas. Characteristics of policies like centralized or 
devolved, rule-based or discretionary, make welfare programmes more or less 
amenable to change and cut-backs.  
This suggests a framework that takes types of welfare provisions as the unit 
of analysis. They have to be meaningful for social administration and distinct 
from politics in the electoral or ideological sense – only then can they be seen 
as creating, rather than being co-extensive with, ‘arenas of power’. But 
scholars in this tradition have not paid much attention to this analytical detail.  
Lowi’s own proposal, to differentiate between distributive, regulatory and 
redistributive types of policies, amalgamates policy with politics by defining, 
for instance, distributive policies as ‘patronage’ (Lowi 1964, 690). Pierson 
(1994, 46) takes big welfare programmes like pensions or housing as policies 
in the sense of ‘politically consequential structures’ which gives the 
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unwarranted impression that the politics of retrenchment is pension-specific 
or social housing-specific. It is in the delineation of types of welfare 
provisions that the new economics can amend the analytical framework of the 
new politics.  
 
Contours of a new political economy of welfare 
The maxim that welfare (reform) politics follows social policies is a 
substantive research hypothesis about the functioning and evolution of 
welfare systems, rather than a more or less useful methodological premise. It 
can therefore serve as a guide through the wealth of empirical evidence on the 
restructuring of single programmes such as unemployment insurance and 
whole systems such as income support to non-employed adults. This guide 
would urge students of reform processes to ask: what were the characteristics 
of the policies that made them vulnerable or prone to attack; and the attack 
likely or unlikely to succeed? Which constituencies were alienated, which 
were attracted by the proposed changes? And is the support for change 
robust or are cycles of policy reversal likely? Obviously, these are questions 
that scholars have asked all along and this proposal does not want to pretend 
anything else: it suggests a systematic way of asking these questions and 
thereby to recognize novel patterns, not to ask entirely different questions.  
The new economics and the new politics cannot be reconciled 
straightforwardly. The economists’ chain of reasoning -- from market failures 
to ‘policy problems’ to social policy solutions (Le Grand et al 1992) -- is a 
functionalist answer to the question why certain policies survive not how 
these policies have come about and hence bears little resemblance to the 
history of welfare state building. Social policy scholars with an intimate 
knowledge of public administrations will notice that in practice this chain of 
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reasoning is reversed.  Policymaking frames the problem it tackles and 
proceeds from policy solution to problem to, if necessary, ex post rationale of 
market failure. Through this framing, policies favour or create stakeholders 
and constituencies, not only in a tangible sense of beneficiaries but also in the 
sense of acknowledging a legitimate need or risk that deserves to be 
compensated. This insight is, as Pierson (2001: 2) indicated, the most 
important reason for why the logic of retrenchment is not the mirror image of 
expansion. And it justifies in the new political economy of welfare starting 
with policies, not with some fundamental, objectively given policy problem as 
economists do18. 
The air of functionalism can explain why the new politics could not relate to 
the new economics which tried to explain even before Pierson (1994) why the 
welfare state is so resistant to retrenchment. With the benefit of hindsight, we 
can see that taking it on board would have helped the new politics to avoid 
relying on the equity-efficiency tradeoff to formulate its research puzzle: 
despite an overwhelming need for reform, typically operationalised as high 
non-wage labour costs, there is resistance to reform (Esping-Andersen 1996, 
18-20, 25; Pierson 2001, 448-451, 456). The new economics can ascribe this 
resistance to valid reasons, presumably when the welfare system still 
provides useful services that help markets function and individuals take 
gainful decisions, hence its stakeholders can beat neoliberal reformers on their 
own turf (Atkinson 1999). The new economics, stripped of its functionalist 
appearance, can thus explain why reforms over the last two decades were 
often taken by pragmatic, centrist social democrats who wanted to mend, not 
abolish public welfare, as political scientists have argued (eg Levy 1999). It 
can also explain why there are no overwhelming economic reasons that 
                                                        
18 To avoid misunderstanding: I think it is perfectly sensible for economists to take this line of 
reasoning as long as they do not claim that their rationales capture historical or political 
processes as well. 
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pressurize governments to cut back welfare (Amable et al 2006). On the 
contrary, it suggests that privatization and liberalization lead to partial 
market failures that are entirely predictable (Barr 2000, 25-26).  
In sum, the new political economy therefore has more room for political 
choice than the new politics with its conventional economic underpinning. A 
good example for an analysis that uses this complementarity creatively is 
Levy (1999: 265) who explores how progressive governments in the 1980s and 
‘90s furthered reforms which ‘target inequities within the welfare system that 
are simultaneously a source of inefficiency’.  
A systematic account of welfare provisions and their changes in the new 
political economy of welfare starts with a more general formulation of the 
standard classification of social policy (insurance, universal and means-tested 
benefits) that also covers transfers and services. Bolderson and Mabbett (1995, 
124-127) distinguish market, public goods, and taxation principles.  
• Market principles capture what is traditionally classified as insurance, 
i.e. welfare provisions based on a certain equivalence between 
contribution and entitlement or mutual contractual obligations; 
unemployment insurance and health care services paid by insurance 
are examples for a transfer and an in-kind service, respectively;  
• Public goods generalise the notion of universal benefits, such as a 
universal child benefit or health and safety regulations at the 
workplace, ie anybody who qualifies categorically (has a child or 
works, respectively) has access and gets a uniform provision;  
• Taxation principles generalize the notion of means-tested benefits for 
which unemployment assistance or free meals for poor children and 
the elderly are examples; both are ruled by law and allocated on the 
basis of (insufficient) income or assets.  
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For the study of what drives hybridization and explains the anatomy of the 
welfare mix, these allocation mechanisms can be disentangled into 
components or seen as tiers of a system (Bolderson and Mabbett 1995). For 
instance, the contribution principle of an old age insurance scheme is often 
mixed with categorical public goods elements such as recognition for 
parenting or comes on top of a basic pension for all residents and a means-
tested layer for low-income workers. These different risks (here: longevity, 
old-age poverty due to an interrupted contribution history or due to 
insufficient earnings) can also be separated and pooled in different schemes. 
Mixing components in one scheme versus layering schemes makes a 
difference for the politics of pensions, eg for the solidarity and inclusiveness 
thus projected. Both mixing and layering can be ideologically motivated 
which can draw on different economic underpinnings. Each allocation 
principle has drawbacks: insurance creates moral hazard and coverage 
problems since eligibility is based on contributions; public goods are one-size-
fits-all and may be wasted on those who do not need them; means-testing 
creates earnings disincentives and low take-up due to stigma. How strongly 
(dis-)functionality supports ideology can be of interest for scrutinizing the 
hypothesis that politics follows policy. 
For larger n comparisons of welfare reforms, a pragmatic approach is to start 
with the hypothesis that there is a certain correspondence between policy 
type and particular forms of politics – an assumption underlying the Worlds 
classification of entire countries. A full theoretical justification for this 
hypothesis is beyond the scope of this article. But to give the idea: insurance 
schemes favour (conservative-liberal) electoral but also corporatist politics as 
the sense of entitlement associated with market exchange is attractive for 
voters and labour market parties who seek some independence from the state. 
Similarly, public goods provision generates (social-democratic) electoral 
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politics because this allocation principle appeals to an egalitarian sense of 
citizenship. Taxation principles tend to be supportive of pressure group 
and/or bureaucratic politics that care about or take care of marginalized 
groups; it appeals to (social-liberal) constituencies that prefer well-targeted 
and depoliticized forms of welfare provisions. The scrutiny of how close these 
affinities are can use the literature on ‘partisan effects’ of welfare state change 
(Kitschelt 1999, Allan and Scruggs 2004, Amable et al 2006) but turn their line 
of argument around and ask not how do partisan leanings affect 
retrenchment and reform but what does retrenchment and reform tell us 
about the ideological underpinning of these changes? This is a relevant 
complementary line of research in times where social democrats march to 
market (Schelkle et al, 2012) and conservatives become compassionate so as to 
extend their reach beyond traditional constituencies.   
This is not to deny that these policy-politics correspondences are rather crude. 
It makes a difference whether electoral politics centres on the median or the 
pivotal voter, whether pressure groups consist of social activists or private 
business, and whether bureaucratic politics is a power play between elected 
governments, on the one hand, and technocratic agencies or state 
administrations with no legal independence, on the other. Again, the role of 
ideological in relation to functional arguments may help to specify the 
particular politics thus created. Details of policy characteristics matter 
(Atkinson 1999: 186). For instance, institutional parameters like coverage, 
generosity, and ‘ownership’ (eg representation of social partners on the board 
of welfare agencies) decide how stigmatising a means-tested transfer or an 
affirmative-action regulation is, and how inclusive or ‘near-market’ the 
operation of an insurance scheme. This will attract and repel different 
potential constituencies of the policy. But it is still a research question that 
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could be taken up more systematically, namely which policy characteristics 
matter; and to whom.  
The answers would greatly enhance our understanding of how the welfare 
state forms social citizenship that dilutes and multiplies the distinctions of 
class (Marshall 1950). Being a mongrel that caters to all kinds of needs and 
risks, not a thoroughbred of a particular class compromise (Bolderson and 
Mabbett 1995), may be exactly how the welfare state overcomes the tension 
between capitalism and democracy and helps to maintain for each legitimate 
social space. 
 
The value added of the new political economy of welfare 
This proposal for a new political economy of welfare has two implications 
that can illustrate its value added. First, the maxim ‘social policies produce 
welfare politics’ is a hypothesis that can be proven wrong. If we find that the 
likely economic effects of a policy change contradict the ideological rationale, 
then there is at least reason to ask whether this inconsistency reveals that 
reforms were driven by politics and challenge the hypothesis. Such a potential 
challenge occurs regularly when means-testing is expanded or introduced on 
manifestly ideological grounds, for instance to end ‘a culture of dependency’ 
and to get the ‘undeserving poor’ back into work, as in the US welfare reform 
of 1996. Economic analysis reveals that this is an ideological statement with 
no strong functional underpinning, because means-testing is more prone to 
cause poverty traps (in various disguises) than any other form of allocating 
social transfers (Atkinson 1999, 83-91; 150-161). The trap is inevitable because 
means-tested benefits have to be withdrawn around the poverty threshold 
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which, together with the onset of explicit taxation, tends to create high 
effective tax rates on additional earnings or savings.19  
Yet even if a reform looks like pure ideology producing (inconsistent) policy 
change, one may still ask whether the ideological justification was really the 
one proclaimed. The working hypothesis that politics follows policy would 
lead one to ask for the hidden agenda that may actually be consistent with the 
policy change. For instance, if the ideological goal is not charitable poverty 
relief but delegitimizing the welfare state in the eyes of middle-class voters, 
then introducing more means-testing is likely to produce exactly the politics 
needed to achieve this goal: policies targeted to the poor produce distinctively 
weak and marginalised political support (Korpi & Palme 1998). Thus, there 
may be cases where politics produces policy but the methodological principle 
on which the new politics was based can at least be used to ask substantive 
research questions, drawing also on economics (here: of poverty traps). 
Second, the new political economy of welfare is not tied to employment-
related social policy as Worlds and Varieties are. By distinguishing between the 
politics and the economics of welfare, it can grasp that, first, what was once 
an employment-based social policy may become detached from the wage 
nexus and, second, that the political significance of the labour market may be 
different from its economic relevance. To start with the latter: Labour markets 
have never been a particular focus of the new economics. They tend to be 
conceptualized as insurance markets that suffer from similar inherent 
information and incentive problems (Agell 1999, F144). The demise of the 
pervasive equity-efficiency tradeoff is closely related to a shift in analytical 
focus away from labour markets. At the same time, the politics mobilized by 
securing the wage nexus of work and welfare has been perhaps the single 
                                                        
19 The EU’s Lisbon Agenda with its emphasis on making work pay suffers from an equally weak 
economic underpinning when it simultaneously asks governments to continuously review 
unemployment and low wage traps and try to avoid them (Schelkle et al, forthcoming).   
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most important building block of modern welfare, although not for all 
programs everywhere (Baldwin 1990; Skocpol 1992). Occupational welfare 
based on collective agreements and social insurance schemes, financed by 
wage-based contributions or income taxes, gave workers – and employers -- a 
stake in the welfare state and even institutionalised welfare independent of 
the state (Swenson 2002, ch.2). But policy choices may change, usually driven 
by a multitude of motivations and structural pressures, and with it the 
political and economic underpinning of this policy. 
To elaborate this point: the various policy choices available for the support of 
families were for a long time seen through the lens of wages for male workers 
(Land 1980). Family allowances were considered to undermine the 
breadwinner’s demand for a ‘family wage’. Hence, trade unions and the 
Labour Party in Britain before the Second World War preferred an extension 
of social services, ie public goods provision in housing, health and education, 
even if they were less well-targeted on wage-earners than a cash benefit for 
parenting. Employers in France, by contrast, introduced family allowances for 
exactly the reason that it moderated wage demands (Land 1980, 65). The 
commonality in the different choices is that a particular policy, occupational 
insurance-based welfare, tends to frame every social policy problem in terms 
of what it does to wages or labour costs around which corporatist politics 
evolves. 
But family policy moved on, not least for the policy-endogenous reason that 
insurance schemes have coverage problems. The employment focus is still 
alive, but a goal like reconciling work and care can also be motivated by 
concerns for the fertility rate in an ageing society or by the imperative of 
gender equality more generally. These motivations play themselves out in 
subtle variations of policy characteristics, eg the set of available formal care 
services and the interaction of cash benefits with the tax system that affects 
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the division of paid and unpaid work between partners. To stay with the 
example of France where family allowances were always a sizeable part of 
income support: in the 1930s, the occupational benefits for the control of 
workers became universal benefits paid to citizens by the state. This brought 
the latent pronatalist motivations – redistributing from childless workers to 
families with children – to the fore (Lewis 1992, 165-166). The public goods 
provision of family support lent itself to electoral politics for the median 
voter. Since the 1970s, however, centrist Gaullist governments introduced a 
number of means-tested benefits, mainly for destitute children and large 
families, which slowly transformed the family allowance system to poverty 
relief with more incentives for women to work part-time or to stay at home 
(Lewis 1992, 167). Subsequent Socialist administrations expanded the 
generosity of these benefits that redistributed from the rich to the poor: 
‘Whereas in 1970, only 12 percent of family allowance funds were allocated on 
the basis of means testing, by 1996 the figure exceeded 60 percent.’ (Levy 
1999, 248) From an economic point of view, this can be justified as increasing 
the target efficiency of family policy for low-income households. Yet the 
problem definition of poverty relief that means-testing purports came under 
attack from the party left that deplored the ‘deuniversalization’ of family 
allowances (Levy 1999, 249). A policy targeted on the poor does not create a 
sense of shared risks or the common ground of citizenship and becomes a 
matter of pressure group or bureaucratic politics; hence it cannot mobilise 
voters on the centre-left for whom poverty and exclusion are actually salient. 
The Socialist government restored universal family allowances in 1999.20  
What this example of French family policy shows is that a welfare provision 
once attached to the labor market may become detached over time. As the 
                                                        
20 This is obviously not the end of the story about Socialist reforms of family policy as one 
commentator rightly pointed out; but the example of French family allowances are meant here to 
illustrate the analysis that the new approach leads one to pursue, not to make a substantive claim 
about French welfare reforms.  
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policy evolves, the functional framing of the policy problem and the politics 
that goes with it may be at odds with the politics that would give electoral 
support to the reformers and thus leads to policy reversal. This is a 
characteristic of reform politics that follows the ‘Nixon goes to China’ logic, 
for instance Social Democratic governments introducing market elements in 
welfare provisions. To grasp this puzzle, we need to keep the economics and 
the politics of employment-related welfare analytically separate.  
 
Concluding remarks on democracy, capitalism and the 
welfare state 
This paper had the same point of departure as popular approaches in the 
comparative political economy of welfare, namely that the study of the 
welfare state raises fundamental questions about the relationship between 
democracy and capitalism. But it argued that the national regime typologies 
around which their analyses revolve have outlived their purpose. These 
typologies presume that entire countries and their welfare institutions fall in 
line with (are caused by) an overarching idea, be it a dominant ideology 
(social democracy, conservatism or liberalism) or ways of achieving class 
compromise more narrowly (liberal or coordinated). It achieved this bold 
stylized portrayal of the welfare state by focusing on the employment 
relationship and the labor market. This left little room for politics and the 
constant battle between temporary public concerns, competing ideas and their 
operationalisation in administrative procedures. It has also no way of 
grasping the puzzle that many reforms over the last two decades went against 
the supposed complementarities of labor market institutions with the welfare 
system, for instance reforms that facilitated the creation of temporary and 
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casual employment that undermines the status and social security of all 
employees, if only because the financial basis of the welfare state shrinks.  
One way forward for a new political economy of welfare is to recognize that 
modes of welfare provision are ‘integral to the way political constituencies of 
social provisions are assembled and maintained in the face of budgetary 
pressures’ (Bolderson & Mabbett 1995, 138). In other words, administrative 
principles of allocating welfare, here: analogous to insurance markets, public 
goods or taxation, create political arenas and lend themselves to varying 
degrees to economic rationales that capture real policy choices and reasons for 
their change. This approach of ‘welfare politics follow social policy (change)’ 
can be directly related to studies of major reforms in mature welfare states, 
which lead to an erosion of regime typologies. The interesting puzzles that 
this approach throws up are located at the level of policies and their reforms, 
how they shape or unsettle, respectively, the relationship of economics and 
politics, for instance: how does a reform of family policy affect labor market 
institutions and can we infer from the thrust of these reforms that the labor 
market institutions were their target all along? Such a question owes a lot to 
the systemic view that regime typologies established but rather than taking 
the system (the institutional complementarities) as given, the question takes 
as given that every public policy shapes a particular political-economic 
constellation. Here: family policy creates particular political stakeholders, 
often strongly value-oriented voters with either a conservative-paternalist or a 
progressive-feminist stance holding diametrically opposed views of how the 
policy should look like, while its design may have been strongly influenced 
by the economic needs of industrial relations.  
A new political economy of welfare must take into account that over the last 
century ever more perspectives and interests have found representation in the 
political processes of mass democracy. It should grasp markets other than 
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labor markets that are or will become more salient politically. The ‘housing 
question’, as it was called in 19th century Germany after Engels’ series of 
pamphlets, is an immediate social policy concern wherever rapid 
urbanisation takes place. In the OECD, the instability of financial markets 
may well become the preoccupation of social policymakers, in particular 
markets for private pensions and real estate (Shiller 2003, Schelkle 2012). To 
tie the political economy of welfare regimes to an economic and political 
theory that centres on labor markets may render it obsolete.  
The proposed reformulation suggests more generally that the classical 
question of political economy was overly impressed by classical political 
economy, from Adam Smith to Karl Marx.  Class compromise was the all too 
obvious answer to a question framed as ‘how is it possible to combine 
capitalism with democracy?’ Modern welfare state building is arguably the 
practical answer to another question, namely ‘how is it possible to keep 
capitalism and democracy distinct?’21 In other words, how is it possible that 
democratically elected politicians are not (seen as) responding only to ‘the 
economy, stupid’ but to demands and needs of the economically non-active or 
undefined as well, be it pensioners, parents, future generations or migrants. 
The short outline of the set-up and reform of family allowances, based on 
three well-known sources (Land 1980, Lewis 1992, Levy 1999), was inserted to 
show how social policy responds to changing needs through the democratic 
process. This evolution is very rarely a direct emanation of economically-
driven class conflict or even of producer group politics.22 Where it is, eg the 
obstruction of health care reform in the US by the private insurance industry 
                                                        
21 Thus, the new political economy of welfare would take on board the differentiation of 
economics and politics in modern society noted in the opening statement of the textbook by 
Caporaso and Levine (1998, 4) ‘It is often assumed that political economy involves an integration 
of politics and economics. It is less often conceded that the very idea of political economy rests on 
a prior separation of politics and economics.’  
22 I owe this formulation to written comments by Peter Hall who put it as a question, not a 
statement. 
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despite crippling costs and manifest problems of coverage, this is deemed by 
all but the most cynical observers as a pathology, not as a normal state of 
affairs in a mature democracy. 
Reform policies and politics over the last two decades, especially by Social 
Democrats, can be seen as trying to disentangle social policy from its 
corporatist embrace (Kitschelt 1999), partly because they feared that this 
embrace stifles the evolution of the capitalist service economy and thus leads 
to an erosion of their electoral appeal. In the process, reformers tend to come 
up with encompassing modernisation agendas. By catering to many requests 
for security, inclusion and social efficiency, the welfare state has diverted 
from the class compromise as its dominant political problem. Liberalisation 
and outsourcing of welfare services have been ways of reducing the influence 
of labor market parties on welfare programs, but reformers then typically risk 
having social policies captured by private provider interests. The boundaries 
between the economic and the political sphere are not a naturally given state 
of affairs, on the contrary, they are contested and more like lines in the sand, 
fragile but conspicuously maintained. This is why the separation, rather than 
the ever present combination, of capitalism and democracy may be more 
interesting to study in comparative welfare state research.23 A more general 
question for political economy is thus: what prevents politicized economics 
taking over capitalism and economistic politics taking over democracy? The 
welfare state is a good candidate for an answer. 
                                                        
23 In a separate project, I analyze European integration as a redrawing of boundaries between the 
economic and the political sphere, claiming that this makes it such a transformative process, 
rather than the compliance with EU norms and legislation that research on Europeanization 
stresses.  
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